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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
EWELL & SON, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
.
'
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMP ANY,
a corporation; UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMP ANY, a corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
12166

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
EWELL & SON, INC.
Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah,
the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover for services rendered
hy plaintiff to the defendant railroads and for damages
for unreasonable delays caused by the railroads to plaintiff's pipeline construction activities.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

At the conclusion of a six- day trial the trial court
entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff against each of the defendant railroads and in favor
of defendant Salt Lake City
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the judgment and its
costs of this appeal.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Appellants' briefs disregard many of the basic rules
of appellate procedure as developed in the decisions of
this Court. Not only have they disregarded clear and
substantial evidence which contradicts in every important
respect the position they take, but they repeatedly quote
testimony out of context and in excerpts which distort
its true meaning and effect.
For example, although it was clearly established that
plaintiff was asked for a price at which he would guarantee that each track would be out of service no more
than 10 hours, see excerpted testimony of Byran D.
Ewell at page 43 of D. & R.G.W.'s brief and the surprising statement at page 46 that "the ten hour guarantee,
whether applicable to all tracks or one, was for the benefit
of Ewell." (Emphasis added.) Similarly in Union Pacific's brief, for example, whereas the evidence showed
a customary and proper inquiry by bvo of the four bidders of Commissioner Catmull to obtain needed clarification of the city's position as it had been set forth
in a lettt-r to the railroads, a copy of ·which was furnishrd
to all biddt-rs, at page 25-27 of the brief is found tlw
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wholly improper and unsupportable statements that
"these two (bidders) were therefore given an itndiw
acl?xmtage over other potential bidders in violation of
the competitive bidding statute," that it cannot "he
doubted that the understanding plaintiff had with Commissioner Catmull ... lowered plaintiff's bid and gave
a competitive advantage over other bidders," and at page
:.ZG that "plaintiff's reliance on the city officials was not
misplaced for they did help plaintiff obtain a favorable
v<>rdict," and finally, that there was a violation of the
statute against "collusive and noncompetitive bidding"
all suggesting, of conrse, collusion or, at least, improperly
favorable testimony for plaintiff from witnesses present!)' or formerly employed by the city who would have
no interest except to see justice done between the parties.
The facts relied upon in many important instances
eontain clear misstatements of the evidence. In many
otlwr instances facts are assumed ·without any support
\\·hatever, except, perhaps in the imagination of defendants' ·witnesses and agents. Many of these discrepancies
are noted in the argument below. Throughout the briefs
appellants seem to have real difficulty viewing the facts
in <-•vidence and inferences therefrom objectively. In
fact, it seems difficult in an over-all vie'.v to understand
that appellants were even involved in the same trial
l1iselos<'d hy the record on app0al.
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S11ATEl\IENT OF FACTS
Because appellants have failed to accurately stat(•
the evidence or to view the evidence and all
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict and
judgment as they are obliged by the decisions of thi8
1Court to do on appeal, their statement of the facts is not
accepted. Because of the numerous violations of thioo
rnle hy both appellants it is not possible in this brief
to point out each such violation. Instead, plaintiff-respondent submits the follO\ving summary 'vhich it believes fairly sets forth the facts clearly shown in the
record.
On July 2G, 1965 the Salt Lake City Engineer wrote
letters to the D. & R.G.W. Railroad (hereinafter D. &
R.G.W.) and Union Pacific Railroad (hereinafter Union
Pacific) advising them that a sanitary sewer line which
would cross their tracks would be let for bid in the nrar
future, and requesting that they furnish their requirements and suggestions (Exhibits 2-P and 3-P), which
they did (Exhibit 11-P).
On September 21, 19G5 letters were again sent by
the city engineer to the respective railroad superintendents (Exhibits G-P and 7-P). Those letters stated:
Ma)- I remind you ·with this letter that 11po11
the rufricc of the Salt Lakr_: City Attorney, we
are to notify yon that npon starting the abon·
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subject project, that this sanitary se·wer line is
to be laid ·within the city street boundaries. Further, that the railroad is operating on and over
these same streets under a franchise agreement,
and that this franchise ·was granted railroad
tracks in this vicinity and contained a provision
that the railrod company would at its own expense, underpin and protect its tracks while a
utility sewer water line et cetera, is being placed
under the tracks. The right granted the railroad
company to occupy a street with its tracks is subject to the superior right of the City to install
utilities in the street as it desires and withoid
additional expense resulting frorn the presence of
said tracks.
Under the specifications for the above construction, we have provided for the contractor
to itse all precaidions in making these crossings
and to notify you prior to starting the work,
and the crossings will be made to your requirements and under your supervision. However, the
City intends to open cut at these crossings, and
we will instruct the contractor to cooperate in
every way to make these crossings with dispatch
and safety, and we expect the same consideration
from, yoitr company to avoid any imneassary
delays.
It is the Citv's intention to advertise for the
construction of this sewer extension in the very
near fntnre, and we ·wish to notify you by this
Jetter of our intention and responsibilities that
we have in this constrnction, as well as the rPsponsiuilities that it is our wulerstanding that you
must acapt. This ldtrr is meant to clarify any
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mis1mderstrrndi119 that might arise in tlw fut11r 1
rt>garding responsibilities between the City aml
the railroad.

If yon have any further questions in
matter, please feel free to contact us. (Emphasis
added.)

Soon then•after prosrwctive bidders were given
of the project and bids ·wt>re invited. Prnspeetin
bidd<"l'S 1vPre JH'ovided with a copy of the project s11eeifications (Exhibit 1-P) together with a copy of the city's
letters to the railroads (Exhibits 6-P and 7-P). Included
within the specifications were General Instructions to
bidders which advised in paragraph 2, page 2 that "Bidders are warned that they must inform themselves of
the character of the work to be performed under
contract. ... "
Four contractors submitted bids on the project and
the bids 1vere opened in a City Conm1ission meeting on
October 20, 1965. Because he felt clarification was necessary regarding the precise responsibility of the railroads referred to in the city's letters (Exhibits G-P and
7-P) Mr. Ewell made inqniry of the city engineer's office
(R. 464:) and both he and another bidder made inquiry of
Commissioner Catmnll hdore the hids were orwned. Tn
response he• advised them that on the city
advice the city would insist that additional costs resulting from the jll'('S<>nce of railroad tracks would haVt' t(I
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he arranged for and paid by the railroads (R. 870).
Tlwreafter at the bid opening he made the same statemcut in open session immediately before the bids were
opPned (R. 872).
rrhe following day, October 21, 19G5 a meeting was
l1eld in the offices of the city engineer attended by a repn•sentative and legal counsel from each railroad, the city
attorney, the city engineer, the assistant city engineer
and a member of the city engineering staff (R. 894).
rrhat meeting ·was called for the specific purpose of
delineating the responsibility for costs as between the
railroads, the city and the contractor (R. 894). The
('i1.\' attorney advised those present of the city's position
as [H'Pviously given by Mr. Catmull to Mr. Ewell and
f11rnislwd legal citations to railroads' counsel (R. 896).
At the end of the nweting it '''as agreed that the contractor would be contacted for the purpose of making an
agreC'rncnt between the railroads and the contractor (R.

A third letter sent to the su1)erintcnclent for each
railroad on October 22, 19G5 (Exhibits 4-P and 9-P)
l'<'confimwd the city's position as follows:
The City Attorney advises me to refer vou to
our lettt'l" oi: Se1)temb.er 21, 19G5 in regard "to the
Citv's intc,nt to construct a sewer line under yonr
on 9th South Street. As stated in said letter
we intend to open cut, and it is your responsibility
to protect your tracks to your ou'11 satisfactio11.
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Please be advised that any tunneling, jacking,
underpinning, etc. is between yoii and whonicver
ymi contract with and does not involve the City
other than to see that our Contractor does ou'r
contract to City specifications.
8aid Contractor has been notified to cooperate fully with the railroads in the execution of
this City contract-48 hours notice etc.
\Ve intend to have the Contractor start consoon and will notify you of the starting
date. (Emphasis added.)
On the same day, October 22, 1965, a second meeting
was held in the city engineer's offices at which the city
engineer, assistant city engineer and Mr. Keytting represented the city, Mr. Byran D. Ewell represented the
plaintiff, a Mr. Robert C. Oatman represented the D. &
R.G.\V. and a Mr. Myron W. Gustin represented the
Union Pacific (R. 466). At that meeting the relatiw
costs to the railroads of jacking or tunneling and open
cutting were discussed and a bid on jacking was obtained
which the railroad representatives thought was unreasonably high (R. 468). Ewell was then asked what the additional cost to the railroads would be for open cnt crossing, assuming a distance of 22 feet for each set of tracks
(R. 468-469), and a
crossing time at Pach set
of tracks of 10 hours or less ( R. 469). Ewell ga \'8 a
price of $34.21 per foot for a 2:2-foot span at each set
of traeks (R. 470).
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The basis of Ewell's price of $34.21 per foot at crossings was that, in order to guarantee to the railroads that
any given track would not be out of service for more than
10 hours, it was necessary to dig as close to the tracks
as possible before interrupting rail service, then concentrate his entire crew of 18 men, including drivers, and all
of his equipment, including eight trucks, two loaders,
and two shovels (R. 471) in order to make each crossing
in the required time (R. 470, 475-81). This concentration
of men and equipment greatly slowed his progress and
:-;llhstantially increased his cost.
Due to lapse of time those present at the October
2:2nd meeting could not recall specific conversation h>'
1he respective railroad representatives follo-wing his quotation to them of the $34.21 per foot price. All except
the railroad agents, however, recalled that no objection
to or disagreement with the quoted price was raised b>'
an>'one at the meeting, nor did the agents deny to plaintiff that the railroads had a responsibility to pay this
]lrice either at this meeting or at any other time (R. 48182). Both the city's representatives and Ewell reasonably understood that an agreement had been reached on
the matter of the railroads' responsibility (R. 482).
On Octohrr 28, 1965 the city gave plaintiff notice
to begin constrnction (Exhibit 8-P). Construction work
within four or fin days thereafter. During the
]1rngT('SS

of construction the railroads' representatives
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were on the job (R. 709, 717, 750, 78G) as the "eyes and
ears" of their employers (R. 759). As requested by thC'
city, Ewell kept those representatives advised as to his
·working schedule to permit coordinationoftlwir activities.
Soon after work was commenced the D. & R.G.vY.
agents discussed W'ith Ewell the feasibility of jacking or
tnnneling nndt>r the tracks near 5th VY est Street rather
than employing an open cnt. After considerable delay
resulting from the indecision of D. & R.G:W. as to how
to proceed (R. 484, 514), a contract, prepared by D. &

R.G:\V. was presented to Ewell for signature (Exhibit
37-P). E-well declined to sign, hO"\vever, because that contract provided for jacking only 40 feet whereas he had
advised them that at least 90 feet would be required to
reach a point where open cutting could be resumed (R.
489, 493). After further discussion and delay a second
contract ·was tendered to Ewell in which the "length of
casing ("was) to be determined by the Railroad's Division
Engineer or his authorized representative." (Exhibit 38P). This contract also provided in paragraph 6 that:
"This contract may be terminated by the
Railroad upon one (1) day's written notice, in
·which event the Railroad shall not be liable to
Contractor beyond payment for ·work performed
and material furnished to effective date of termination."
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Following execution of this contract by Ewell he
was delayed even furtlwr because the D. & R.G.W. agents
still could not decide whether to open cut or jack under
the tracks (R. 499). Finally, on November 10, 1965 being
unable to wait further he instructed his jacking subcontractor to proceed even though a final go-ahead had not
hcrn given by the railroad (R. 499).
On November 11, 1965 Ewell explored along the
cast side of the railroad tracks which were being jacked
undt>r, and, upon digging down with a backhoe, discovered
that a large 4-foot storm sewer which was not indicated
on the city's plans, intersectc>d his line of progress. He
advised the D. & R.G.-\V. representatives shortly after
noon and was immediately told to stop tunneling (R. 495).
1:,n:ll insisted than any notice to terminate be put in
1

writing and a letter was delivered to him at about 4 :30
p.111.

(R. 49G). That letter from the Division Engineer

39-P) provided:
"Please be advised that our contract terminates after 40 lin. ft. of casing has been pushed,
tunneled or jacked in place and centered on the
\vestt>rly track."
At the time the notice was delivered more than 40 feet
of casing had already been jacked (R. 497) and within
U hours thereafter the jacking had bPen finished ( R.
;jlJ()).
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Because the storm sewer had not been accurately
platted Salt Lake City assumed responsibility and paid
for 30 feet of jacking (Exhibits 20-D and 21-D), but D. &
R.G.vV. refused to pay for anything beyond 40 feet, notwithstanding Ewell's refusal to sign a contract for only
40 feet (Exhibit 38-P).
During the balance of construction plaintiff encountered further delays to its progress, with attendant idleness of men and equipment, because the respective railroads failed to have their signal lines uncovered and
exposed (R. 811-12), a task which they insisted on doing
themselves (R. 664-66).
In this suit plaintiff claimed the agreed price of
open cutting, the contract price for jacking from which
had been subtracted the city's payment of $3750.00, and,
finally damages for unreasonable delay as disclosed in
the evidence. At the conclusion of the evidence the matter
was submitted to the jury and it returned its verdict in
favor of plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT SECTION 54-4-15, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, DID NOT
VEST EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THIS CONTROVERSY IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION TO THE
EXCLUSION OF THE LOWER COURT.
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It is argued on behalf of defendant D. & R.G.\V.
that by virtue of Section 54-4-15, U.C.A., 1953 only the
Public Service Commission could have jurisdiction to
hear and determine the present controversy. Such contention not only misinterprets the clear language of the
statute, but disregards the context under which this technical defense was raised in the present case.
Section 54-4-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides
as follows:
"(2) The commission shall have the exclusive power to determine and prescribe the manner,
including the particular point of crossing, and
the terms of installation, operation, maintenance,
use and protection of each crossing of one railroad by another railroad or street railroad, and
of a street railroad by a railroad and of each
crossing of a public road or highway by a railroad
or street railroad, and of a street by a railroad
or vice versa, and to alter or abolish any such
crossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to
certain types of traffic in the interest of public
safetv and is vested with power and it shall be
its d{1ty to drsignate the railroad crossings to be
traversed bv school buses and motor vehicles
carrying pa:ssengers for hire, and to require,
where in its judgment it wonld be practicable,
a separation of grades at any such crossing heretofore or herpafter established, and to prescribe
the terms upon which snch separation shall lw
made and the proportions in which the expense
of the alteration or abolition of snch crossings or
the separation of snch grades shall be divided
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betlveen the railroad or street railroad corporations affected, or between such corporations and
the state, county, municipality or other public
anthority in interest."

It will be readily noted that, although this section refers
to "the maintenance ... of each crossing ... of a street
by a railroad" as the brief of D. & R.G."\V. states, at no
point does it refer to the installation 'Under a railroad of
a city utility line. The statute refers to (1) the crossing
of one railroad by another railroad, (2) the crossing of
a public road or highway by a railroad, or vice versa, (3)
the abolition of any such crossing, ( 4) restriction on usP
of such crossings to certain types of traffic, and ( 5) the
separation of grades at such crossings and allocation
of expenses related thereto. The scope of the statute is
limited to very specific situations. Under no proper
interpretation of the statutory language could it be
applied to the city's natural and reasonable extension
of its se·wer facilities.
No explanation is offered as to why the Public
Service Commission would or should have an interest
in the activity involved here. The obvious purpose of
this statute is to vest jurisdiction in the Public Service
Commission over surface rail and highway traffic facilities which by their location necessarily involve a continuing potential interference or conflict ·with other sur-

face facilities for traffic and travel. The se"'er line in
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the present case as installed could not involve such a
hazard to or interference with rail or highway traffic or
the facilities related thereto.
Section 54-4-25, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, cited in
the brief of D. & R.G.W., does not apply to the present
situation. That section provides in part pertinent here
as follows:
"No . . . sewerage corporation shall henceforth establish or begin construction or operation
... or ... extension of such ... line ... without
having first obtained from the Commission a certificate that present or future public convenienc<'
and necessity does or will require such construction; provided, that this section shall not be constrited to require any sitch corporation to secure
sitch certificate for an extension within any city
or town within which it shall ha:ve heretofore lawfully commenced operations, ... provided further,
that if any public utility ... shall interfere or be
about to interfere with the operation of the line,
plant or system of any other public utility already
constructed, the Commission, on complaint of the
public ittility claimi11p to be injitriously affected
after hearing, make such order and prescribe
such terms and conditions for the location of the
lines, plants or systems affected as to it may
sN•m just and reasonahle." (Emphasis added.)
11 herefore, en>n if Ewell & Son, Inc. is deemed under

thP abon' statute to be possibly subject to the jurisdiction
of the Pnhlic Service Commission, that jurisdiction must
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be invoked by the pnblic utility whose operations are
interrupted-in this case the railroads.
It will also be noted that the Complaint was filed
February 28, 19GG (R. 11), the Answer of D. & R.G.W.
was filed March lG, 19GG (R. 21), and a Pretrial Hearing
was held April 4, 19G8 (R. 34-35). Discovery was thereafter completed and in February, 1970 the case was given
a trial setting on May 12, 1970. An Amended Complaint
vrns filed April 13, 1970 and D. & R.G."W.'s Answer thereto \rns fil0d April 27, 1970 (R. 38) in which, for the first
time the lower court's jurisdiction was challenged. By its
failnre to file a complaint with the Public Service Comrni ssion as provided in Section 54-4-25, and its failure to
raise the jurisdictional defense until two weeks before
trial after the discovery and pretrial phases of the casr
had been completed, the D. & R.G.W. waived any such
jurisdictional defense it might otherwise have had.

The case of Provo City vs. Department of Busiiu'ss
Regitlation, 118 Utah 1, 218 P.2d G75 (1950) relied upon
by defendants, involved a conflict between Provo City
and the D. & R.G.vV. over the permanent blocking of a
public strf'et. The decision there -vvas limited in scope
as the opinion states:
" 1N e have before us the single question: does
the Public Service Commission haw jurisdictio11
to hear and determine controversif's over tlw
opening, closing or maintenance of railroad crossing( s) within nrnnieipal
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rrhat case, which involved a permanent blocking of surface traffic, is not authority for the contention that the
lower court had no jurisdiction to settle the present case
involving contractual rights and damages from tortious
dday of plaintiff's construction activities. The lower
court, therefore, had jurisdiction under Article VIII,
Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah which
provides that "the District Courts shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal not excepte<l
in this Constitution and not prohibited by law."

POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT WITH UNION
DOES NOT VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY.

PACIFIC

Union Pacific argues in its brief that the work undertaken by plaintiff for Union Pacific was required by
N<'ction 10-7-20, U.C.A., 1953 to be placed upon comJletitive bidding. Further it is argued that because Commissioner Catmull "told those two potential contractors
that the railroads would pay any extra cost involved ...
t·ach of those two were therefore given an undue advantage over other potential bidders in violation of the comp<'titin• bidding statute." It is then argued that since
the contract is "illegal" or "is hased upon a consideration
which is illegal" and because "plaintiff did no labor and
furnislwd no materials not alread>· covered by the ...
contract ·with Salt Lake City," that to "allow relief herein
would allow Salt LakP City and plaintiff to violate with
impunity (tlw comrwtitivf' bidding statute)."
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T11is rather remarkable argument not only miseonstrues section 10-7-20 but misstates the eYidence and
draws conclusions which are without any justification
whatsoever.
To begin with, section 10-7-20 requires competitin•
bidding only as to costs which are to be paid out of publie
funds. That section provides:
''10-7-:20. K L'cessity for contract-Call for
bids-Af'cPptance or rejection. \Vhenever the
board of commissioners or city council of any
city or the board of trustees of any town shall
contemplate making any new improvement to be
paid for oitt of the general funds of the city or
town, such governing body shall cause plans and
specifications for, and an estimate of the cost of,
such improvement to be made . . . . " (Emphasis
added.)
By contrast, the contract found by the jury to
been
present between the union Pacific and plaintiff hen·
involved services and materials furnished in meeting·
Union Pacific's special time requirements. These time
requirements did not inyolye the city so ·were not madl·
a part of the plans and specifications, and could not have
been paid for from public funds.
This argument also disregards tlw fact that in ordt>r
to give his lowf>st reliable bid to tlw city a contractor
is obliged to make full mqmry into all facPts of the
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projPct. Since a project of this type often affects the
properties and operations of others, it is imperative
that the contractor determine beforehand the full scope
of the city's requirements and responsibility for payment.
In the present case the contractor was furnished with
a copy of the city's letters dated September 21, 1965
(Exhibits 6-P and 7-P) in which the railroads were
advisPd that the city expected them to arrange for and
pay any expenses incident to their own requirements.
Further, the contract itself (Exhibit 1-P) at Page 2 under
"General Instructions to Bidders" specifically cautioned
liidd<•rs as follows:

"2. Bidders ll1'C warned that they nwst ,i11form themselues of the character of work to be
performed irnder this contract . ... " (Emphasis
added.)
'I1lrns, to suggest, as the hriPf of Union Pacific does,
that thP inquiry made of Commissioner Catmnll hy two
of the four bidders, as to the division of responsibility
hehvP<'n the city and the railroad, '.Vas illegal or improper
and a subversion of the bidding statute is totally unrealistic and without merit. ThP
was conect in its conposition that arrangements would liave to be made
with thP railroads for payment of extra costs incident
to
their special n·quirements (R. 87:.?). rrhe
information askt•tl of Connnisl-limwr Catmull was availnlilr· to any intercstPd persons, as it should l>e and to
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suggest that it was secr(•tly and improperly olitainPd
overlooks not only the fact that it "\vas conveyed to th<'
railroads several weeks before the bid ovening (Exhibit:;
G-P and 7-P) but also that it was publicly announced
in commission meeting and was discussed fully "\Yith tht·
railroads and their counsel the following day.
Union Pacific's carele:,;s and unfounded contention
that by Yirtue of an infened "collusive" promise obtained
from 1Cornmissiom•r Catmull plaintiff and one other bidder wNe able to gn,atly underbid the job is unsupportt•d
by any eyidence that the second low bidder was en•n tlw
one who talked to the Commission('!'. Mr. Catmull offered
to furnish the name of the otlwr contractor "\Yho talkPd
to him (R. 878) but this off er was never followed up hy
the defendants.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE AMPLY SUPPORTS THE FINDING
OF A CONTRACT WITH EACH OF THE RAILROAD DEFENDANTS.

Both of the railroad defendants argue that, as a
matter of law, no contract, expn•ss or impfo•d, could
haYe arisen between plaintiff and either of the railroads
nnder the evidence in this casP. Both rely u1>on OH'
testimony of Mr. Ewell that he neYPr ''demand(•d" that
the railroads pay his offen•d price and his further testi-

21
mony that he could not reeall a specific promise on their
part to imy at the Octolwr 22nd mC'eting. To support this
position the hrief of D. & R.G.\\T. quotes extensively from
portions of
te8timony and from the seriously
<'ontradickd and discredited testimony of their own ·witm•ssl's Oatman and Gustin. Both contend that silence
on tht>ir part cannot he construed as an acceptance of
Ewrll's offer.
rrlie evidence, hmn•ver, as pointed out in the statellH'nt of facts above, shows, in summary, that the railroads were told hy tlw
several weeks before bids
\\'Pl"<' let that
rnnst
costs incident to their special
l'P(1niremenh; and that tlw meetings on October 21 and
19G5 dealt
with the delim•ation of tlw
railroads' responsihility and the making of arrange11wnts to satisfy their s1wcial
There was
strong l'Vidence at the trial, moreover, that at the meeting
with Mr. Ewell on Octoh<·r 2:2, l9G5 he was asked not
to
that each crossing would lw made in
10 honrs or less to rninimi?;e interruption of :->t>rvice on
defmdants' tracks, hut the cost of tunneling and jacking
was explon•d then rejech>d and Ewt>ll \\·as asked to quote
a price at ·which he eould rnePt tlw 10-hour time guarantre
using tht> opc.>n-cnt 11wthod. Although Mr. Ewell could
not l'<'call a speeifie acc<'ptaneP of his offer of $34.21 per
foot for a 22-foot lrngth at t>ach erossing, the circmn:-;tancPs of that rneding and th<• course of the discussion,
as rdat<>d hy at !Past fom partieipants, justified tlw
j11ry's finding that the raihoads had agT<'<'d to that offrr.
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l\foreoHir, l\Ir. Carter's letter to the Union Pacific in
Df'cember,
14-P) states that l\Ir. Ewell's
prices qnokd at the October meeting l\'l're "verhall)·
agreed to."
Fnrthermore, following that meeting the railroads'
respective representatives werl' on the job on a dailr
hasis observing plaintiff's operations. It is not disputed
that each of the railroad crossings was accomplished
plaintiff in 10 honrs or l('Ss as was agreed. 'l'Irns, even
if a:;;sent had not lwen expressl)· giyen at the meeting on
Octolwr 2:2, J9(i;:J, and tlwre is evidence to the contrar.\·
(Exhibit 14-P), the jnry conld haYe properly found, a-;
it prohahly did, that h)T it:;; conclnct thereafter in iiermitting- the 1rnrk to continne according to l\Ir. E1vPll's offer,
amounted to a wainr
\\·ithout disdairning
of the right to disclaim thereaffrr.
Eqnall:· signifieant on the question of
is the
fact that on Nowmher lG, 19(i5 .Mr. E1n,ll hand-d0liwre(l
to each of the railroads a letter setting forth his claims
for delays and his vPrsion of the agrPt>ment r<>ached at
the October 22, 19G5 m<'eting regarding extra charges ai
each c.rossing (J£.xhihits 44-P and 45-P). At that time the
construction work was in iirogn•ss and only a few of the
crossings had bec'n madt> (R 509). The first re1>ly to
eithPr of thos<' letters, hmn•v< r, was not given 1rntil
1

1110n•

than a month later h:· a ldt<:•r clakd Decemher :21, l!JGj
(Exhibit 41-P) which, incidentally was also sPnt after a
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hilling from plaintiff dated Decf'mber 10, 19G5
(Exhihit -!:)-P). Ko rf'ply 1rn;-; ginn hy D. & R.G.vV. until
()(·c<·rnlwr 2S, l!JG5 (Exhibit 40-P) following a second
hilling from Jllaintiff dated Dec<·mlwr 9, l9G5 (Exhibit
+:2-P). Enn the letter of D. & R.G.W. dated December
:2.\ 19G5 did not dispntt> the charg(•s for specified crossings, the plaintiff being
aclvis<·d to el1argP all
"'Cl\f P tmuwl liner" to the eit)·.
Particnlarly int(•n•sting at this point is the explanation of 1\fr. Michael
D. & R.G.\Y.'s assistant
<li\·i;-;ion mgineer, who testified that the NoVPmlwr lG,
19()5 letter wm; hronght to his attention soon after it
\ras rec'<•ind !mt he 1wyer bothered

to discuss it witi1

?11 r. Em•ll "hecause tlzc job U'as not finished and I
as:·rnmed ... that thPn' would proliahly he another letter
eorning in hecans<' that tl1ing seemed completely Prroneons." (Emphasis added.) ( H. 717). Yet knowing the job
was

eontinuing and that plaintiff claillwd the right to

1·xtra pay at ea<'h crossing .:\Ir. Kenyon said nothing and
no denial of
\l<'eks

was madP until some five

latPr whPn the job 1\·as finished.

fo this n•gard, it is int<'n•sting to note that the case

of Trncson Steel
Cir.

Co111j)(lll.IJ

v.

Cooke,

F.:Zcl

(10th

npon ·w11id1 D. & H.G.\V. r<>li<•s for the proptliat siln1cP cannot he construed as an aecrptancC',

(lO<•s 11ot aetnall)·

SO

hold.

rl'llPIP

it is stated:
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"Under certain circumstances the offeree may
authorize or canse the offeror to regard silence
as an acceptance of his offer, such as by conduct
in past dealings. Williston on Contracts, Rev.
Ed., Vol. 1, page 228, says; A further extension
of this doctrine is developed in the cases-that,
where an offeree solicits the offer, this, in the
light of the relations of the parties or other surrounding circumstances, may justify the offeror
as a reasonable man in interpreting the offeree's
silence after receiving the offer as acceptance."
That Ewell reasonably interpreted the silence as acc<:>ptance was the proof in the prt>sent case and such was the
jury's finding.
Union Pacific places ht>avy reliance npon the case of
illcCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468 (1952)
to support its claim that it had no implied contract with
plaintiff. That case, howevt>r, gives strong support to
plaintiff, because the test for implied contract is thrre
stated to be :
"Under all the evidence, were the circumstances such that the plaintiff could reasonably
assume he was to bP paid and that the defendant
should have reasonably expected to pay for such
services."
This court there made it clear that one is not free from
an obligation to pay for benefits knowingly rendered to
him except where there is basis to believe the benefit
is conferred gratuitously:

''] i is ap]ll'(_•ciated that this rule should not
IH' applied to hind one und<•r implied contract
\\'ho llH'n·ly permits Sl'rvices to lw rendered him,
or aecPpts lwnefits from anotlH•r, under such circumstances that he may reasonably assume they
are given gra tui tom;];,·."

.\ltl10ugh dd'('ndants' own witnesses dispnted having
agT<•t>cl to pay th<' priee they aclmi tted having obtained
l'rn111 I•:wvll, there was strong P\'idenee pn•st>nt('d that
tlw <·irem11stane<•s }ll'ior to and during tlw ltH-'dings in
( letolwr, l!J(i5 W<•re sueh ns to en•ate a q1wstion of fact
a:-; to
E\\·<'Jl eonld reasonably haw e:-qwctPd to
!H· paid on the basis of th<' prie<> lw quoted to tht> railrnads. Th<-' conduet of the railroads tlwreaftpr in permitting the work to progress without objection on their
part not only snpports the inference that they actuall>agreed to the terms but is strong evidence as well of
\rniver of any ohjection thl'Y may have had. Having
knowingly had the benefit of the ten-hour maximum
tinw limit at each crm;sing the railroads cannot then
cl<>cline payment of the agr<'ed price upon the ground
thc-->· did not formally agree in writing. The jury properly
so found from the great weight of the evidence.

POIX'l 1 1\'
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED THE
QUESTION OF THE RAILROAD AGENTS' AUTHORITY TO
THE JURY.
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Incredibly, both railroad defendants contend that
there was no basis in the evidence from which the jury
could have found tlmt the railroads' respective agents
had authority to bind them to any contract with plaintiff.
Union Pacific blandly states contrary to strong evidence
in the case that "the evidence established that there was
no actual authority ... to bind U.P.," and that the court
failed to instruct on "the established fact of lack of
authority."
Although the railroad representatives denied at the
trial that they had authority, the jury was not bound to
believe their testimony on this point in view of their
obvious interest, their strongly discredited testimony on
every other material point and their actions in purporting
to represent the railroads not only at the pre-construction
October meetings (with the railroads' respective legal
counsel at the first meeting) but throughout the progress
of construction thereafter. They attended the meetings
for the respective- :railroads after formal letters had been
sent by the city engineer to the railroad superintendents
indicating the city's position. They asked Ewell for his
price to them for proceeding by the open cut method.
They were on the job as it progressed in accordance
with the discussions that had been held.
As for the railroads' conduct after the October meetings, it is important not only that Ewell's letters
hibits 44-P and 45-P), outlining his understanding of the

agreement reaehed at the meetings in OctobL'r, went
1mansw(•rt>d until more than a month lakr but that
eontact 'vith the railroads, whose repre:sentatives were
at the constrnction site on a daily
. basis ' was maintained
ihrough the same agents whose authority is now denied
( R. 754-75ti, 758). Abo, that those same agents normally
rn'gotiat<>d for work to he done hy contractors and the
J). & H.o.·w. agC'nt would pn'sent the railroad\.; contract to
lw signed by tlw eontrnctor befon' it would be signed by
th<· rnilroacl (R 75(i, Exhibit 37-P). The contractor was
11ot advi;:;ed as to the identity of the railroad agent who
1wrnld sign the contract or what his authority was (R.
738). He never told Ewell his authority was limitl:'d
(R. 758, 759, 793).

'11 0 claim as the defendants do that, as a matter of
law, "reasonahle minds could not differ that (Ewell's
n•liance uvon thC'ir agent:s' l'L"presentations and their
apparent authority) was unreasonable" is absurd under
ihP <>vidence in this case. Having attended the meetings
ealled by the city engineer to settle the railroads' respon:-;ihility, having asked
to give a price, having seen
him make each crossing within 10 honrs on the jobsite
without objection, having conferred with him on the jobas the railroads' represPntative on coordination of
and loeuting signal lim•s and having negotiated
and cleliw1wl tlw D. & R.G.-\V.':-; contraet for jacking
on ht>half of tlw railroad it is ridiculous to claim Ewell
('onld not lwlp lrnt know he was dealing with rnen "·ho
b(l no authority to speak for the respectiYe railroads.
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On the contrary, the circumstances show overwhehningly
that Ewell and the city both had every right and reason
to deal with and rely upon these agents who came into
the discussions and onto the jobsite apparently representing their employers at each step. The jury properly
found that the agents were authorized and/or that their
employers failed to properly disclaim their acts.
A corporation acts through its employees and agents.
These defendants acted on this construction project
through the same agents whose acts they now disclaim.
These men made contacts and commitments on their
behalf as would be expected. Must persons dealing with
them obtain approval of the defendant's corporate officers in writing in order to bind them? Such a position
is not realistic in today's business community. As is
stated in the case 0. S. Stapley Company v. Logan, G
Ariz. App. 269, 431 P.2d 910, 913 (1967):
"[W] ell established in the law is the proposition that a principal cannot escape liahility by
leaving his business in the hands of ag·ents, then
denying their authority to act for him."

POINT V
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN PERMITTING WITNESSES AT THE TRIAL TO STATE WHAT
THEIR UNDERSTANDING WAS OF THE DISCUSSIONS
WITH RAILROAD REPRESENTATIVES.
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Both railroad dd'c>ndants complain that witnesses
\rho attPncl!•d the Octoher, 19(i;) mPPtings with railroad
n' prt'srnta ti ves we re i1ermi ttPd to sta tP that railroad
n·rH·esentatives did not ohjPet to th0 price gwell gan
to them at th<>ir solicitation. Complaint is also made that
those in attendaneP at the October meetings were permitted to state tlwir und<'rstanding as to what had heen
n·so l\'P< 1.
ln overrnling th<' railroads' ohj< etion to this testi1

the lower eonrt stated:

"1 believe he ean state what he thought was
the understanding, but he can't testify what the
other people thought." (R. 367)
cas0s have involved objections to testimony of the
kind r<>frned to abov0 upon the basis that it goes to
thP farts in iss1w. That faet alonl', however, does not
rnak!' sneh tPstimony ohjectionahle as this Court pointed
ont in Josepl1 v. lV. II. Gro/'es L.D.S. Hospital, 7 Utah
:-H), 31S P.2cl 330 (1!);)7), "·hieh statPs:

''lf thP opinion P\'idence was sueh that it will
aid th<> jury in 1mclen-:tanding tlwir problems and
lPacl them to th!· truth as to the disputed issues
of fact, it is eomp!'tcint and admissihl<>, irrespecti\'e
of wlwthtir it hf'ars
upon th<> nltimate
fact the
is to dPtPnnine. And thr trial judge
is ulf01('cd l('ide discretion i11 r1'9ard to the all01L'n11cr' of such testi111011.11. (Euqiliasis added.)
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In the present case it will be noted that the trial
took place some four and one-half years after the events
in question occurred with consequent dimming of memory
of specific words and acts. As a result the witnesses
could not recall specific conversations although their
memories were clear as to general matters discussed
and as to what they had understood from the discussions
as a whole. Thus their testimony was admitted as an
aid to the jury in making its determination as to whether
Ewell had reasonably assumed that there was an agreement and that he would be paid for his extra services in
meeting the railroads' special requirements.
In Howard v. lllissman, 81 Idaho 82, 337 P.2d 59Z
(1959), appellant complained of the trial court's allowing
a ·witness to respond to the question: "What impression
did you gain from the fact that he had slowed down r
The court held such testimony admissible where the
witness is in a position to know the facts upon ·which
the conclusion is based and has testified to such facts.
In the present case the lower court not only limited
the basis for admission of the challenged testimony, as
noted above, but in addition, in the court's instruction
to the jury No. 6 (R. 102) the jury was told not to consider as evidence any impressions or conclusions drawn
from statements made by representatives of the parties.
Further, in instruction No. 35 (R. 132) the jury
told the test for an implied contract is "whether a person
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in plaintiff's position conld under all of the circumstances
then existing, reasonably
assnmed that it would
lw paid for se1Tices, if any, rendered."
POINT YI
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT WITH EACH OF THE DEFENDANT RAILROADS WAS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE
CONSIDERATION.

Both of the defendant railroads argue naively that
any contract with them was invalid for lack of considt>ration. Ignoring clear, snbstantial and credible testimony from at least six witnesses and extensive documentary evidt>nce to the contrary, both flatly state that
plaintiff performed no task and provided no service
not already included in its contract with Salt Lake City,
as to which they claim to be third party beneficiaries.
'11hat the railroads were advised in writing they must
arrange and pay for their own special requirements
cannot be dispnted. That s1wcial meetings were h<>ld to
diiicuss s1wcifically the railroads' responsibility to the
C'ontractor for their requirements not included in the
city's contract was clearly established in the evidence.
That the special time gnarantee cost the contractor
rnhstantial extra cost is not to be denied. That the rail1 nad

re} m•senta tivf's asked for a price to them from

\n•ll is conc<>d<•d l'V<'n by tlw railroad reprPsenta tives
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themselves. That the railroad representatives agreed
to Ewell's proposal, although unconvincingly disputed
by the railroads' witnesses, was strongly attested to not
only by witnesses and documents but, significantly, by
the fact that at no time until after the work was done
did the railroads claim they were not responsible.
It is submitted that to claim Salt Lake City should
pay for extra costs made necessary to meet the 10-hour
minimmn time requirement of the railroads is nonsensical. The time requirement was not imposed in the contract because it concerned only the railroads. It was
imposed by the railroads for their own benefit. If the)'
truly thought they had no responsibility for the crossings
why did they ask for and receive Ewell's offer of $34.21
per foot for 22 feet at each crossing.

POINT VII
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR UNREASONABLE
DELAYS TO PLAINTIFF'S CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES
WAS PROPER.

Both railroads claim that the award of damages
for delay as to each of them "'as erroneous and improper.
First, it is argued that because the contract with the city.

to which neither of them was a party, precludes ''any
claim from or damage on account of hindrance or delay
from any cause whatsoever" (Exhibit 1-P, p. 19) that
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tl1e railroads, and apparently the whole \vorld, are protected. rchis argument runs contrary to the purpose and

spirit of the pre-job meetings and correspondence with
the railroads' representatives, in which they were advised
that t•xtra costs caused hy them were to be paid by them,
and as to which they did not object. In addition, such
a contention, if accPpted, would either place an unreasonable and unlimited risk of delays and interference npon
tliP eontractor or vastly increase the cost to the city to
allow for a rather nelrnlous "public cooperation" or
"']\'vel of anticipated interference" factor. If the railrnads' contention were accepted they would have an unlimited license under the city's contract, to which they
W<'re not parties, to delay or hinder the contractor with
impunity, however, whenever and wherever they felt like
it. 80 would anyone else. The contract was between
the city and the plaintiff. Its provisions relafing to scope
of work and
did not, and could not, govern plaintiff's duties and rights as against the rest of the world.
The railroads both point to provisions in plaintiff's
('Ontract with the city which outline its duty to cooperate
with other utilities in scheduling its work so as to mini1uize interference with their activities and avoid damage
to th0ir facilities. Apparentl>· both railroads view these
Jirnvisions as a one-wa>r street since they now deny any
duty of coo1wration in scheduling to avoid
nmwePssary Px1wnse and dPlay to the contractor. This
r·ontPntion is untenable.
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The evidence showed that, although plaintiff would
willingly have uncovered the signal lines well in adrnnce
of its pipe laying crew, the railroads insisted that they
should be permitted to handle this themselves. The evidence also showed that Ewell gave notice to the respective railroads of his progress well in advance of the
48-hour period required by the city's contract. N otwithstanding this notice the railroads, because of indecision
and failure to schedule their work, caused plaintiff's
entire crew and equipment, including laborers, trucks,
tractors, shovels and operators to sit idle for substantial
periods. Plaintiff was delayed first by D. & R.G.W.
representatives' indecision as to whether its tracks should
be open cut or jacked. Delays were caused thereafter
because the railroad signal lines had not been exposed.
Another basis of complaint against the award of
delay damages is the railroads' wholly unsupported claim
that the jury's award gave plaintiff an unjustifiable
double recovery. Here again the railroads resort to misstatement of the evidence and they disregard substantial,
credible and persuasive testimony and documentary evidence in pressing this position.
In summary, the evidence showed that the extra
costs charged by plaintiff did not result from requirements for more or different materials than those required
by the city's contract. His offer to cross each set of tracks
within 10 hours or less by open cutting for ,$;)4.21 per

1
s
r
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foot for 22 feet took into account only the estimated
additional time inYolyed in concentrating all men, eqnipnwnt and effort in the area of a single crossing to meet
the l0-ho11r guarantee rather than spreading the equipnwnt and activity to a normal or customary interval as
to lioth distanre and tinw.
clearl)· that Evve>ll's quoted
'l'he evidPnce
priet> was in addition to and not in lien of prices pro\'itl<·tl in th0 rit)·'s contrnet. The railroads' rontPntion
that plaintiff is seeking a double recovery is without
snpport in the record.

POINT YIII
THE JURY PROPERLY FOUND THAT D. & R.G.W. WAS
LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF FOR 70 FEET OF JACKING.

The inability or unwillingness of the defendant railroads to view tl10 evidence in this case with any degree
uf ohjeetivity is nowhne more apparent than in the
elaim of D. & RG .,V. that, as a matter of law, it is not
l'l'Sponsible for jacking under its written contract with
plaintiff. This claim not only overlooks the strong evidt•11ec• of had faith and deliberate harassment on the
part of D. & R.G.,Y.'s re>presentatiYes, bnt it disregards
thP cxpn'ss prn,·isions of its own coutract as well.
'Vitl10nt going into detail, it is sufficient to say that
E,1-pll rd'use>cl to sign the first contract tPndcred to him
D. & H.O.W. agents
37-P) because, as
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advised them, it was impossible to resume open cut laying
of the pipe after only 40 feet of jack. (R. 489, 493). The
second contract (Exhibit 38-P) was signed only after he
had insisted without objection from the agents, that no
less than 90 feet of jacking would be required (R. 631,
637). The claimed right of D. & R.G.W. to terminate the
jacking and require commencement of open cutting at
any given point, even after 5 or 10 feet evidences a
complete disregard for plaintiff's burden as the contractor. It is from an engineering standpoint completel;'
nonsensical ( R. 629, 641, 657). It would have actually
increased the expense to D. & R.G.W. and interrupted
its traffic (R. 657). Even the Union Pacific's division
engineer had never heard of such a thing (R. 794).
On the whole, the D. & R.G.\V.'s claim in this regard
was wholly discredited and no doubt rejected by the jury
as it should have been.
Even more important, however, in support of the
award for jacking was the specific contract provision
(Exhibit 38-P, paragraph 6), not mentioned in D. &
R.G.W. 's brief, which required "one (1) day's written
notice to Contractor" of termination. In this regard
the evidence clearly established that at the time written
notice of termination was given (Exhibit 39-P), and
even so in improper form, more than 40 feet had alread.r
been jacked. Within one day after notice of termination
was received all of the jacking claimed against. the rail-
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road had been completed. Thus it is difficult to understaml how D. & H.G."W. could seriously contend that it
is not n sponsible for this jacking expense, part of which
1

was Yoluntarily paid for by the city because of its error
in failing to plat a large storm drain located in the same

,·icinity.

POINT IX
SUBMISSION OF THIS CASE TO THE JURY ON A GENERAL VERDICT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

D. & R.G.-w. argues that the trial court abused its
discretion and committed reversible error by refusing
1o snhmit tlie case to the jury on interrogatories or a

yerdict. The basis for this alleged error is supposed to be the jury's inability

to separate liability of

the three defendants to plaintiff.

In Baker v. Cook, G Utah 2d lGl, 308 P.2d 2G4 (1957),
this Court stated:
''As hen•tofore observed, great care should
be takPn to suhmit questions to the
so that
tlw.\· arr clear as possible. ·when a general verdict
will best sl'tt!P the issues, it should be USPd. vVhen
s1wcific issrn's cannot be n aclied
a general
the trial court should tak<' adYantage of
:-q)(lcial Y!'n1ids or s1wcial interrogatoriPs. ''
1
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It is clear that the jury understood the issues involved and were able to separate the liabilities of th!;
parties. The jury was specifically instructed in Instruction No. 45 that each defendant was entitled to fair and
independent consideration of its defenses and was not
to be prejudiced by a finding against any other defendant. The verdict in favor of Salt Lake City is clear
evidence that the jury was able to distinguish between
the acts and liabilities of the several defendants.
r:rhe law in this case was neither complicated nor confusing. r:l1 he contested issues of fact, although several in
number, were rather clear-cut and easily susceptible of
determination from the evidence. That they were resolved by the jury favorably to plaintiff is not surprising
in view of the rather compelling evidence produced at
the trial on plaintiff's behalf.
As to the amount of the verdict, this also ·was a
basically simple calculation. The gist of the railroads'
defense was not directed to the amount O\ved bnt to the
proposition that no arnoitnt at all ·was owed. The amount
awarded by the jury was the amount asked in the Complaint and the amount proved at the trial by detailed·
testimony. D. & R.G.\V.'s claim that the jury must necessarily have been confu::>ed because it rendered its verdict in accordance with the Complaint and
simply does not bear close examination. This was an
action in contract. The amounts asked for were precisely
calculated and explained; under tho ovidence there 1ra'
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lit t I(' room for adjusting the amounts.

The money
amounts the jury had to deal with were greatly simplified
as c0111pared to, for PxamplP, personal injury cases ·which
jmi<'s decide ev<Ty day hy use of tllP p;t>neral vPrdict.

POIN"11 X
THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT PREJUDICIAL TO
APPELLANTS.

Several objections are made in appellants' briefs to
the lower court's instructions to the jury. The objection
eommon to both appellants that the jury should not have
l1<'en allowed to consider the issue of express contract
is treated above in the discussion dealing with implied
eon tract.
rrhe claim that the issue of express contract was
im]Jroper by Union Pacific is inconsistent with its req1wsted Instruction No. 2 \vhich provided:
''You are instructed that a condition prececl<•nt to the enforcement of any contract is that
there be a meeting of the minds of the parties
\\·ltich mnst be spelled out either expressly or
im zJl iedly with snffi ciPnt defini kness to be enforced." (H. 173) (Emphasis added.)
1t wilJ abo lie note\l that Union Pacific's req1wsted
instrndions

:i,

4, !l (H. 17G, 177,

all also deal with
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oral contract. Similarly, the objection of D. & R.G.W.
to submission to the jury of the issue of express contract
is inconsistent with its requested Instructions 5, 11 and
13 (R. 161, 167, 169) all of which present the issue oi
express contract as compared to implied contract.
Union Pacific's requested Instructions 3 and 9 were
given; D. & R.G.W.'s requested Instructions 5, 11 and
13 were given either verbatim or in substance. These
requested instructions reflect a recognition that under
the evidence the jury could properly have found that the
railroads expressly agreed t0i Ewell's offer. The letter
of Mr. Carter, city engineer, to Union Pacific (Exhibit
14-P) refers to a verbal agreement. The testimony regarding the meeting on October 22, 1965 lends itself to
such a finding notwithstanding the fact that a lapse of
time precluded a recollection of specific conversation
to that effect.
Union Pacific asserts that the instructions as a whole
precluded a fair trial because they were contradictory,
confusing and misleading. It argues that the order of
giving the instructions was unfair in that its requested
instructions were given first followed by those of D. &
R.G.W. and then those of plaintiff.
Union Pacific argues specifically, for the first time
on appeal, that Instruction No. 11 and No. 33 are contradictory (R. 927-29). It snbmitted Instruction No. 11
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(R 107, 184) and failed to raise any issue of the alleged
contradiction in the trial court. In Pettingill v. Perkins,
C tali 2d 2GG, 272 P .2d 185 ( 1954) this Con rt stated:
''The duty is incumbent upon counsel to give
the trial court the opportunity to correct the error
lwfore asking the appellate court to reverse a
\'erdict and judgment thereon. Furthermore, it is
\\'ell established that a party cannot assign as
('l'l'Ol' the giving of his own requests. He cannot
heard to
ll'ad tl1P conrt into error and then
complain thereof."
Union Pacific's only objection to the trial court in this
n'ganl was the broad assertion that tlw instructions generally Wl're inconsistent and contradictory (R. 929). Rule
51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, however,
that "ln objecting to the giving of an instruction, a
]Jal'ty must state distinctly the matter to which he objects
and the grnnnds for his objection."
rrhis Court pointed out in Emvloyers' llhct. Liability
lJ1s. Co. v. Allen Oil Co., 123 Utah 253, 258 P.2d 445,
130 (1953), that the purpose behind the Rule 51 requirenwnt is to give the court an opportunity to correct error.
Tlw broad general exception made by Union Pacific
was of no vahw to tlw trial conrt in correcting the
>]ic·eific errOl' it now asserts.
Union Pacific's objection to the order of giving the
instructions is non•L Its instrnctions were ginn first-
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a factor that would be considered highly favorable by
many attorneys. ·whether the instructions given first or
last have the greatest impact upon the jury is a matter
upon which opinion may vary. To say the order of the
instructions here prejudiced any party assumes the jury
would lmow whose requests were being given or that the
requests were themselves unduly favorable to the party
on whose behalf they were submitted. Such simply
not the case.
Instruction No. 50 (R. 147) specifically stated that
"The order in which the instructions are given has no
significance as to their relative importance."
If the order of giving the instructions
a basis for reversal then every appeal would involve
this issue. In such cases, the argument whether the
instructions first given 'vere the most or least effectire,
prejudicial or fair would depend upon the order in which
the appellant's instructions were given.

D. & R.G.W. argues that the trial court went beyond
its authority by instnlCting the jury on the claims of
the parties in Instruction No. 26. Its position appears to
be that any instruction other than on the law is prPjndicial error. If this were the rule then almost e\·ery
would require reversal upon appeal. Interestingly, D. &
R.G.W. does not argue that Instruction No. 26 misstaterl
its position or the position of other parties. It is difficult
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to see how it was error to advise the Jury as to the
position of the parties.
The purpose of instructions are to assist the jury
in nndPrstanding their task-to "enlighten the jury on
its prohlems." Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse Co., 1G
Utah 2d 186, 398 P.2d 24 (1965 ). Part of the jury's task
is to nnderstand the claims of all the parties. If one
party is asking for a money amount the jury has the
1wed and right to know in the instructions the amount

claimed and how the total was arrived at. This was the
effect of Instruction No. 26-it summarized the parties'
allegations.
The jury must be assumed to have followed the

Williams v. Ogden Union Railway and
Depot Co., 119 Utah 529, 230 P.2d 315, 322 (1951). This

instructions.

lJeing the case, how could it be reversible error that the
jury was instructed on the parties' assertions when by

other instructions they are required to make their decision based upon the evidence and upon proper proof?
lndeed, it is "incumbent upon the court to instruct
thr• jury on the law applicable to the theories of both
]Jartic>s insofar as such theories are supported by some
L'1·idence." Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d
fili4 (19()()).
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On appeal, a challenged instruction "should be considered in its entirety, and along with all of the other
instructions given to determine whether they accomplished what is essential: explaining to the jury in a
manner understandable to them the issues of fact and
the law applicable thereto with reasonable accuracy, and
with fairness to both sides." Badger v. Clayson, 18 Utah
2d 329, 422 P.2d 665, 666 (1967). Instruction No. 2G
was fair to all parties.
Instructions Nos. 28 and 29 on apparent authority
are complained of by defendants as not supported by
evidence. This Court explained apparent authority in
Melia v. M 01dton, 100 Utah 562, 114 P.2d 208, 211 (1941):
"Either by action or inaction where there is
the duty to act, the principal may create a situation the reasonable interpretation of which, by a
third party with whom the agent is about to deal,
is such as to lead that third party to believe that
the agent has authority to deal with him as contemplated. Under such circumstances the law will
hold the principal responsible to that third party
for the results of that deal -with the agent."
In Santi v. Denver cf; Rio Grande Western, 21 Utah 2d
157, 442 P.2d 921 (1968) it was held that whether a
circumstance would be such as to cause a plaintiff to
place "reasonable reliance" upon the representations of
an agent was a question of fact. In this case the jury
found the issue against the railroads.
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11ht' activities of tlw railroads in this matter gav<'
tlw jul',\' snhstantial evidence upon which to find a1>varent authority. Defendants' conkntion that their agents
\ren• ·withont actnal authority to contract for them is not
n·sponsive to this issne of appar<•nt anthorit:·.
If the agents sent by the railroads to tlw meetings
m•n• nnantl10rized to contract on hehalf of the railroad,
c·.ontrary to what would have been the reasonable expectation of those in attendance, then any such limitation
of the agents' authority should have been disclosed. The
same agent alleged to be without authority testified that
he at times is the only one who would deal with a contractor such as plaintiff (R. 755-5G), that he normally
does not tell a contractor who will sign on behalf of the
railroad (R. 756) and that he never told Ewell of his lack
of authority though he was the "eyes and ears" of D. &
R.G.W. in this matter (R. 758-59).

Union Pacific's agent testified that a contract could
he signed on Union Pacific's behalf in Salt Lake City
(R. 77 4) and that he had many times entered into contract negotiations for his company (R. 785).
CONCLUSION
During six days of trial the defendant railroads
\1ere given a full opportunity to present their respectiw

positions to the Conrt and the jury. An abundance of
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issues, factual and legal, were disputed. Eight witnesses
testified and a large number of documents were produced
on behalf of the plaintiff. Seven witnesses and additional
documents were produced on behalf of the defendant
railroads. The issues having been thoroughly explored
the matter was submitted to the jury which was given
51 instructions, most of which were requested by the
respective parties.
In the over-all view the instructions fairly outlined
each of the theories of the parties, pro and con. Upon
consideration of the evidence the jury found in plaintiff's
favor. That verdict is supported in every particular by
substantial, credible and convincing evidence. That verdict and the Judgment entered thereon are fully sup·
ported by the weight of the evidence and applicable law
and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
REED L. MARTINEAU,
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
7th Floor, Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Counsel for Plaintiff-Responde11t

